As it is primarily addressed to the slot player, its goal (. Therefore, it is not a so-called how-to-win book, but a complete, rigorous mathematical guide for the slot player and also for game producers, being unique in this respect. It contains all the mathematical facts grounding the configuration, functionality, outcome, and profits of the slot games. This eighth book of the author on gambling math presents in accessible terms the cold mathematics behind the sparkling slot machines, either physical or virtual. Arguing for the role of mathematics in problem-gambling prevention and treatment, interdisciplinary research directions are drawn toward implementing an optimal mathematical module in cognitive therapies. Given the ethical aspects of the exposure of mathematical facts behind games of chance, and starting from the slots case – where the parametric design is missing, we have to draw a line between ethical and optional information with respect to the mathematical content provided by a scholastic intervention. ) that would optimize the structure and content of the teaching module. In this paper, I bring some criticisms to the empirical studies that tended to answer no to this hypothesis, regarding the sampling and laboratory testing, and I argue that an optimal mathematical scholastic intervention with the objective of preventing problem gambling is possible, by providing the principles (. On the question of whether gambling behavior can be changed as result of teaching gamblers the mathematics of gambling, past studies have yielded contradictory results, and a clear conclusion has not yet been drawn. I find that, on average, contributing no less than about 40% of individual fitness to public goods production still is an optimal strategy from an inclusive fitness perspective under plausible socio-ecological conditions. Using data on contemporary hunter-gatherer societies I then estimate a threshold value determining when biological altruism turns into maximizing inclusive fitness in this game. Here, I investigate analytically how genetic relatedness changes the incentive structure of that paradigmatic game which is conventionally used to model and experimentally investigate collective action problems: the public (. Many of these focus on direct and indirect reciprocity, assortment, or (cultural) group selection. Phenomena like meat sharing in hunter-gatherers, altruistic self-sacrifice in intergroup conflicts, and contribution to the production of public goods in laboratory experiments have led to the development of numerous theories trying to explain human prosocial preferences and behavior. Finally, the mechanism we propose eliminates not only all pure strategy equilibria involving unequal divisions of the dollar, but also all equilibria where players mix over different demands in the first stage. We also provide an $n$ -player extension of our mechanism. ![]() ![]() In the two-player version of this game, there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which players demand (and receive) an equal share of the dollar. In particular, they play an ultimatum game to avoid the excess. In the modified game $(D\!D^)$, if the demands are incompatible, then players have one more chance. We modify this second part, which involves a harsh (. In the standard DD game, if the sum of players’ demands is less than or equal to a dollar, each player receives what he demanded if the sum of demands is greater than a dollar, all players receive zero. We modify the payment rule of the standard divide the dollar (DD) game by introducing a second stage and thereby resolve the multiplicity problem and implement equal division of the dollar in equilibrium.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |